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I. Introduction 
 In 2003, both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ enacted changes to 
the requirements regarding listed companies and their Board of Directors composition. 
The changes placed stricter restrictions on who could sit on the compensation 
committees of listed companies. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of 
those changes, specifically in relation to CEO compensation and compensation 
committees. Prior to the regulation changes, Yermack [1997] explored the topic of 
CEOs manipulating the timing of their stock option awards by using their influence over 
their compensation committees. He found that in general, CEOs received stock options 
just before good news was released about the company. In theory, CEOs would then 
benefit from the following scenario: a company would release good news, leading to an 
increase that company’s stock price and in turn raising the value of the CEO’s stock 
options. In this study, I look at the same timing issues Yermack studied, but for 
companies at a post-regulation change date. Furthermore, I consider the differences 
between the pre-change and post-change values to analyze the control effects the 
regulation changes had on CEO stock option awards. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II overviews the 
previous literature on related topics. Section III describes my methodology and the 
accompanying data. Section IV discusses the results, and Section V explores potential 
areas for future research. Finally, Section VI concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
Academic literature about the effects of corporate governance on CEO 
compensation reveals mixed results. However, these mixed results are not necessarily 
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unexpected. An issue at hand presented by many researchers is that the off-equilibrium 
scenario plays a major role in corporate governance, but cannot be observed. This 
leads corporate governance research to become what Demski and Sappington deem to 
be a “summarization with errors” in Demski and Sappington [1999]. The key 
components of CEO compensation, the CEO’s pay structure and her performance, are 
both multidimensional and contain unobservable factors (such as friendship, jealousy, 
etc.). As such, my research focuses on an observable factor, stock option timing, while 
keeping in mind the importance of not overextending the reach of my conclusions. 
 In the aforementioned Demski and Sappington [1999], DS take a broad look at 
the corporate governance research conducted. Through their examination, DS find 
many potential pitfalls for research resulting from the oversimplification of the 
connection between manager pay and performance. The prominent idea here is that 
manager performance and compensation are both multidimensional and that it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accurately measure the various dimensions of 
performance and compensation. As an example pitfall, DS discuss the lack of 
consideration for intertemporal effects in previous studies of manager compensation. 
Oftentimes, these intertemporal effects are many, but research simplifies the effects and 
aggregates them into one overarching effect that happens to change over time. Again, 
the key issue here is not the oversimplification of factors affecting manager 
compensation and performance, but rather it is the understanding that many of these 
factors are simply unobservable, leaving corporate governance and manager 
compensation research to be a “summarization of errors”. 
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 Demski [2003] further explores this idea, speaking to the role of multiple players 
and multiple conflicts of interest in corporate governance. With so many players 
involved, the conflicts and relationships become more complex. While simplifying the 
situation is useful for instructional purposes, considering the complexities is important 
when studying corporate governance. If a researcher does not acknowledge the 
presence of certain unobservable factors, it could easily lead to off-base conclusions. 
For example, in Antle and Smith [1985], AS find that implicit manager contracting 
arrangements are just as important as explicit arrangements are to measuring manager 
compensation. Although valuing those implicit arrangements is extremely difficult, at 
least taking them into consideration is essential. 
 In Bebchuk and Fried [2003], BF explore the concept that executive 
compensation is both a solution and part of the agency problems prevalent in the 
corporate world. To their point, the authors show that the Board of Directors actually has 
little incentive to work against the CEO in terms of the CEO’s compensation. The Board 
is subject to the same agency problem it is trying to solve, for the power to re-nominate 
directors resides with the CEO. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker [1999] seem to have 
evidence supporting this argument. In their study of the effects of weak corporate 
governance, CHL discover that there is a significant negative association between the 
percentage of the Board composed of inside directors and the total compensation of the 
CEO. With a strong emphasis on company Board of Directors, it seems appropriate to 
analyze changes affecting the composition of the Board. 
 Extending beyond CEO compensation, there is much corporate governance 
research relating to stock pricing and the timing of certain stock price fluctuations. In 
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Patell [1976], Patell studies the information conveyed to stockholders through forecast 
disclosures. A key component of Patell’s research is the presentation of the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) calculation. A CAR essentially represents the performance of a 
company’s stock price above or below what is predicted. Dodd and Warner [1983] use a 
methodology similar to Patell to calculate abnormal returns as they examine stock price 
activity around proxy contests. 
Yermack [1997] follows Dodd and Warner’s methodology to analyze the stock 
prices that occur before and after company stock option grants. The key finding in 
Yermack’s study is the potential manipulation of stock option award timing, which allows 
managers to receive their stock options just before the company releases good news. 
So managers would benefit from a jump in their company’s stock price occurring 
immediately after they received their stock options. As previously mentioned, much of 
my work follows up on Yermack’s stock option timing analysis and this finding, except in 
a different time period following the 2003 regulation changes. 
III. Yermack’s Stock Option Awards Revisited 
 When Yermack originally conducted his study, regulations regarding Board of 
Directors composition were far more relaxed, and CEOs could sit on their own 
compensation committees. In fact, Yermack explicitly examined the cases in which the 
CEO did sit on the compensation committee. However, since 2003, the regulations have 
changed for the NYSE and NASDAQ. NYSE [2003] explains that for companies to 
remain listed, their compensation committees must be entirely independent. NASDAQ 
[2003] features a similar stipulation for their listed companies, requiring that CEO 
compensation be approved by an independent committee or by a majority of 
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independent directors during an executive meeting. These rule changes, if properly 
enforced, put an obvious damper on the influence CEOs have over the compensation 
committees. However, the possibility remains that CEOs can find some new, 
unobserved method of influencing the timing of their stock option awards. In this study, I 
put that possibility to the test and examine the differences between data representing a 
time period prior to the regulation changes of 2003 and data from a year following those 
regulation changes. 
To analyze the effects of the regulation changes on CEO stock option awards, I 
use Yermack’s methodology for both the pre-change and post-change values. 
Specifically, I collect CEO stock option data from the proxy statements filed by Fortune 
500 companies in 1997 and in 2004 (my reference companies are all included on the 
2004 edition of the Fortune 500). I also use the Execucomp database to supplement the 
data presented in the proxy statements. For the 2004 companies, the proxy statements 
reflect the actions of the companies following the regulation changes made by the 
NYSE and NASDAQ at the end of 2003. The stock option data of interest here are the 
strike price and the award date. Much like in Yermack’s study, my methodology and 
analysis revolve around the award date of the stock options. In cases with multiple 
people holding the position of CEO during the same year, I again follow Yermack’s 
original method and use the data for the person in office the longest. On another note, if 
a company issued stock options at multiple times within a year, I treat each stock option 
issuance as a separate data point, or essentially as a separate company. These actions 
result in a sample of 15 companies for 1997 and a sample of 18 companies for 2004. 
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 In terms of the CAR calculation, I need stock price data around the award dates 
for the sample companies, and I gather this data from the CRSP database. Using the 
data, I calculate the abnormal returns following the Dodd and Warner [1983] 
methodology with a minor change. The focal point of Dodd and Warner’s methodology 
was the following equation for abnormal returns: 
)ˆˆ(ˆ MarketRRRAR iiitititit   . 
Here, itR  is the continuously compounded rate of return to security i at event day t, and 
Market   is the continuously compounded rate of return to the CRSP value-weighted 
index at event day t. Also, iˆ  and iˆ  are regression variable estimates derived from the 
regression MarketR iiit    for a time period before that of the analysis. The change I 
make is that I use a holding period return provided by CRSP for itR . I do this for 
simplicity reasons, although the different types of returns do provide an interesting topic 
for future research, and I discuss this in more detail later on. In his study, Yermack 
cumulated the abnormal returns to find CARs up to 20 trading days before the award 
date through data 120 days following the award, and I follow suit with my event time 
period as well. The equation I use to calculate the CAR values from the abnormal 
returns for firm j is straightforward:  




jt
jt
jtj ARCAR
120
20
. 
To accommodate for my event time period, I use the stock return values from 40 days 
before the award date to 20 days before the award date to calculate iˆ  and iˆ . The 
sample companies and their respective iˆ  and iˆ  values are shown in Exhibit 1 and 
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Exhibit 2. From the CAR data, I find the mean CAR value for each date in the event time 
period. 
Up to this point, my study is essentially a replication of Yermack’s work for data 
of different time periods. However, to investigate the effects of the regulation changes of 
the NYSE and NASDAQ, I look at the differences between the mean CARs for 1997 
and the mean CARs for 2004. Taking the differences between the mean CARs for each 
date in the sample, I calculate the t-statistics for the data points. The null hypothesis 
here is that there has been no significant change between 1997 and 2004. In other 
words, I test the calculated differences to see if they are significantly different from zero. 
These calculations, although quite simple, provide a glimpse of how the daily CARs 
have changed over the years. 
While the previous calculations reveal the CAR changes on specific dates with 
respect to the award date, of even greater importance is the trend of the CARs around 
the award date. The general trend further reflects the overall impact of the regulation 
changes. Assuming the changes did indeed hamper the mean CAR values, one can 
expect the 1997 data to trend upwards at a faster rate than the 2004 data. I explore the 
trends by regressing mean CARs against days relative to award. Here, the mean CARs 
are the dependent variable, and the days relative to award are the independent 
variable. An integral part of Yermack’s study was that the mean CARs continue to trend 
significantly upwards starting from the award date all the way through the 120th day after 
the award date. Yermack found no such trend prior to the award date, however, 
signaling the opportunistic timing of the awards. I seek to see whether Yermack’s trend 
holds true for 
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Exhibit 1: 1997 Sample Set Key Information 
  Company (Ticker Symbol) 
Grant Date Stock 
Price (from 
Execucomp) Award Date Alpha Beta 
1 Wal-mart Stores (WMT) 24 1/10/1997 -0.0036 0.1462 
2 Ford Motor (F) 31.9375 3/14/1997 -0.0015 0.6749 
3 ChevronTexaco A (CVXA) 80.938 10/29/1997 0.0002 1.4889 
4 ChevronTexaco B (CVXB) 72.125 3/26/1997 -0.0012 1.0160 
5 Kroger (KR) 26.88 5/12/1997 -0.0033 0.4547 
6 Target (TGT) 37.38 1/8/1997 0.0043 0.9660 
7 Bank of America Corp. (BAC) 65.375 7/1/1997 -0.0055 1.0895 
8 Costco Wholesale (COST) 26.875 4/2/1997 -0.0011 0.2654 
9 Dell A (DELLA) 37.062 3/5/1997 0.0045 1.1751 
10 Dell B (DELLB) 74.08 7/18/1997 0.0056 1.0631 
11 Dow Chemical (DOW) 79.9375 2/12/1997 0.0017 0.4124 
12 United Technologies (UTX) 75.875 2/24/1997 0.0003 0.6846 
13 Intel (INTC) 69.69 4/22/1997 -0.0044 1.0689 
14 UnitedHealth Group A (UNHA) 46.875 2/11/1997 -0.0024 0.2038 
15 UnitedHealth Group B (UNHB) 43.0625 10/27/1997 0.0000 0.6654 
 
 
Exhibit 2: 2004 Sample Set Key Information 
  Company (Ticker Symbol) 
Grant Date Stock 
Price (from 
Execucomp) Award Date Alpha Beta 
1 Wal-Mart Stores (WMT) 53.35 1/5/2004 -0.0056 0.5769 
2 Ford Motor (F) 16.49 1/5/2004 0.0028 1.3590 
3 ChevronTexaco (CVX) 47.055 6/30/2004 -0.0009 1.1880 
4 Intl. Business Machines (IBM) 105.96 2/24/2004 0.0001 1.2918 
5 Kroger (KR) 17.31 5/6/2004 -0.0048 1.2058 
6 Target (TGT) 38.25 1/14/2004 -0.0011 1.2938 
7 Bank of America Corp. (BAC) 81.55 2/2/2004 0.0015 0.6839 
8 Costco Wholesale (COST) 37.35 4/1/2004 0.0012 0.7992 
9 Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) 53.93 2/9/2004 0.0008 0.3576 
10 Dell (DELL) 32.985 3/4/2004 -0.0027 0.8222 
11 Marathon Oil (MRO) 33.61 5/26/2004 0.0048 1.0858 
12 MetLife (MET) 35.26 2/17/2004 -0.0016 0.6285 
13 Dow Chemical (DOW) 43.49 2/13/2004 -0.0035 1.8899 
14 Allstate (ALL) 45.96 2/6/2004 0.0010 0.5805 
15 Wells Fargo (WFC) 56.86 2/23/2004 -0.0027 0.8287 
16 United Technologies (UTX) 93.52 1/9/2004 0.0014 0.9897 
17 Intel (INTC) 27.00 4/15/2004 -0.0032 1.4485 
18 UnitedHealth Group (UNH) 59.40 2/11/2004 0.0033 -0.2025 
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my pre-change and post-change numbers, and if the post-change trend is suppressed 
in comparison to the pre-change trend. As such, I compare the coefficients calculated 
for my 1997 data and for my 2004 data.  
IV. Results and Discussion 
 Examining the differences between the 1997 mean CARs and the 2004 mean 
CARs, I find that the 2004 mean CARs are indeed dampened in comparison to the 1997 
values. In fact, the only date at which the 1997 mean CAR is not greater than the 2004 
mean CAR is at day -20. Furthermore, in general, the differences become more 
significant as time progresses. Exhibit 3 shows that the differences are significant at a 
10% level at the 60th and 70th day after the award date, and that they are significant at a 
1% level as early as the 90th day after the award date. 
 The regressions provide further support of how great the difference is between 
the two sets of mean CARs. The two regressions followed the simple form: 
awardtorelativedaysCARmean ____ 10   . 
I find that the coefficient, or 1 , for 1997 is over two times greater than that for 2004. 
Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5 present this data in graph form. Of particular interest in Exhibit 4 
is the mean CAR activity around the award date, or lack thereof for 2004. When 
Yermack conducted his study, he found a significant jump in mean CARs just after the 
award date. Looking at the graph of the 1997 mean CARs, I notice a similar jump in 
value at the stock option grant date. The mean CAR value drops on the day of the stock 
option award and then rises immediately afterwards. However, the jump at the award 
date is not especially pronounced in my 1997 data. In fact, there is an even greater 
jump 20 days after the stock option award. Interestingly enough, in 2004, there are no 
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Exhibit 3: Comparison of Mean CARs  
Days Relative 
to Award 
1997 Mean 
CAR (%) 
2004 Mean 
CAR (%) 
Difference 
(1997-2004) 
t-statistic (H0: 
difference = 0)  
-20 -0.0072 -0.0046 -0.0026 -0.0619  
-15 0.0154 0.0062 0.0092 0.2174  
-10 0.0430 0.0203 0.0228 0.5385  
-9 0.0429 0.0246 0.0183 0.4328  
-8 0.0408 0.0290 0.0118 0.2783  
-7 0.0450 0.0260 0.0190 0.4497  
-6 0.0451 0.0279 0.0172 0.4067  
-5 0.0502 0.0260 0.0242 0.5721  
-4 0.0454 0.0235 0.0219 0.5189  
-3 0.0494 0.0220 0.0274 0.6478  
-2 0.0558 0.0242 0.0316 0.7479  
-1 0.0612 0.0266 0.0346 0.8188  
0 0.0492 0.0266 0.0227 0.5363  
1 0.0617 0.0230 0.0387 0.9141  
2 0.0674 0.0284 0.0390 0.9230  
3 0.0702 0.0317 0.0385 0.9092  
4 0.0672 0.0286 0.0386 0.9132  
5 0.0555 0.0304 0.0251 0.5943  
6 0.0571 0.0304 0.0266 0.6297  
7 0.0605 0.0299 0.0307 0.7255  
8 0.0604 0.0316 0.0288 0.6813  
9 0.0651 0.0298 0.0353 0.8348  
10 0.0677 0.0340 0.0337 0.7963  
15 0.0736 0.0416 0.0320 0.7567  
20 0.1017 0.0416 0.0601 1.4217  
30 0.0981 0.0558 0.0424 1.0013  
40 0.1185 0.0725 0.0460 1.0874  
50 0.1380 0.0796 0.0584 1.3810  
60 0.1648 0.0786 0.0862 2.0376 * 
70 0.1561 0.0801 0.0759 1.7951 * 
80 0.1802 0.1112 0.0690 1.6318  
90 0.2160 0.0958 0.1202 2.8427 ** 
100 0.2271 0.1029 0.1242 2.9362 ** 
110 0.2377 0.1042 0.1335 3.1563 ** 
120 0.2788 0.1097 0.1691 3.9981 ** 
 
**Significant at 1% level. 
*Significant at 10% level. 
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Exhibit 4: Comparison of Mean CARs
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Exhibit 5: Comparison of Regressions
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obvious jumps in the mean CAR values. So, the 2004 mean CARs are suppressed and 
appear to be smoother than the 1997 mean CARs. 
 The significance of the differences in mean CAR values and the lack of a mean 
CAR jump in 2004 lead me to conclude that an external or environmental change 
decreased the ability of managers to influence their stock option award timing. The 
regulation changes of 2003 provide a quick and easy explanation for the additional 
controls on CEOs. However, I hesitate to place all the “blame” on the regulation 
changes made by the NYSE and NASDAQ. While the regulation changes seem like the 
obvious answer, there may be implicit and unobservable contracts that worked 
alongside the explicit regulations to affect the timing of stock options. Nevertheless, the 
regulation changes do seem to have at least contributed to, if not completely caused, 
the suppressed 2004 mean CARs. 
V. Research Extensions 
 These results lead to some further questions. First, as touched upon earlier, one 
might consider the effects of using different definitions of the itR  and Market  values. 
The CRSP database provides many variations on the market return calculation, with 
each variation weighting the components of the market return differently. Also, my use 
of the holding period return for itR  may have led to different results from those I would 
have found had I instead used a continuously compounded rate of return for itR . 
Specifically, Yermack’s data reveals a growth rate of mean CARs far greater than that 
of my data for both 1997 and 2004. Using the holding period returns for my firm return 
values could have further suppressed the mean CAR values in my data. There is also 
the possibility that even between the time period of 1992 to 1994 (the time period for 
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Yermack’s data) and the 1997 time period I use, there were changes in the external 
environment placing additional controls on the influence CEOs had over the timing of 
their own stock option awards. One possibility is that companies began to reward stock 
options at approximately the same time each year. Such a reward schedule would 
clearly obstruct the CEO’s ability to time the arrival of good news with her stock option 
grants. Another possibility is that companies extended the waiting time before the 
vesting period of the stock options began. By pushing the vesting period farther into the 
future, the companies would be aligning the CEO’s interests with long-term company 
success. As with the routine stock option award schedule, this change in the vesting 
period would make it difficult for the CEO to manipulate the timing of her stock option 
awards to coincide with good news. Or at the very least, the CEO would be focused on 
performing well in the long run to have good news arrive just after the vesting period 
began. These questions are beyond the scope of my study, but they lend themselves as 
topics for further research. 
 Another point of contention is whether awarding CEOs stock options just before 
the release of good news is detrimental for the company and its stakeholders in the first 
place. Perhaps it is in the best interest of certain companies to time their stock option 
grants in such a fashion to provide a stronger performance incentive for their CEOs. 
Oftentimes, the general public holds the notion that CEOs getting paid large sums of 
money is necessarily a harmful action for the company. What is overlooked is the 
potential explanation that companies must pay high incentives in order to promote 
certain actions from their respective CEOs. Moreover, if a company pays too much, 
then it will fail while other companies succeed. However, the connection between this 
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company self-selection idea and CEO compensation becomes blurred during times of 
recession, especially when the government awards company bailouts. In such a 
situation, the extraordinary payments to CEOs are far less defensible as the public 
suffers from the recession. Again, this question of what is best for a company or for the 
economy in general is beyond the scope of my study, but it is an interesting topic for 
future research. 
VI. Conclusion 
 My study explores the timing issues presented in Yermack [1997], but with 
respect to the regulation changes enacted by the NYSE and NASDAQ in 2003. I look at 
two sets of data: one representing companies that granted stock options in 1997 (before 
the changes) and another representing companies that granted stock options in 2004 
(after the changes). From my results, I find that the 2004 mean CAR values around the 
stock option award date are dampened in comparison to the respective 1997 mean 
CARs. This dampening leads me to conclude that the regulation changes indeed 
affected the mean CARs and provided additional controls over CEO manipulation of 
stock option award timing. 
 Although the results lead to a conclusion of the regulation changes being 
effective, they also lead to more questions as well. Neither my 1997 data nor my 2004 
data showed as great of an increase in mean CARs as was presented in Yermack’s 
study. I question whether this is a result of a difference in methodology or a result of 
changes in the external environment. Furthermore, I consider the possibility that timing 
CEO stock option awards to match the release of good news is actually helpful for the 
company, rather than harmful (as is generally accepted). While these questions are 
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beyond the scope of my study, they present themselves as interesting topics for future 
research. 
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